We present a mathematical physics analysis of entangled translucent eavesdropping in quantum cryptography, based on the recent work of Ekert, Huttner, Palma, and Peres ͓Phys. Rev. A 50, 1047 ͑1994͔͒. The key generation procedure involves the transmission, interception, and reception of two nonorthogonal photon polarization states. At the receiving end, a positive operator valued measure ͑POVM͒ is employed in the measurement process. The eavesdropping involves an information-maximizing von Neumann-type projective measurement. We propose a design for a receiver that is an all-optical realization of the POVM, using a Wollaston prism, a mirror, two beam splitters, a polarization rotator, and three photodetectors. We present a quantitative analysis of the receiver. We obtain closed-form algebraic expressions for the error rates and mutual information, expressed in terms of the POVM-receiver error rate and the angle between the carrier polarization states. We also prove a significant result, namely, that in the entangled translucent eavesdropping approach, the unsafe error rate based on standard mutual information comparisons is equivalent to the maximum allowable error rate based on perfect mutual information for the eavesdropper. In this case, the above unsafe error rate is in fact not overly conservative.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of secure key generation in quantum cryptography, one can employ a train of single photons having two possible equally likely nonorthogonal polarization states ͉u͘ and ͉v͘, which encode 0 and 1, respectively, to securely communicate a random bit sequence between a sender ͑Alice͒ and a receiver ͑Bob͒ in the presence of an eavesdropper ͑Eve͒. Recently, Ekert et al. ͓1͔ presented an analysis of an entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario of key generation in quantum cryptography. In the present work we carry their analysis further for an approach that uses two nonorthogonal photon polarization states. The eavesdropping is translucent in the sense that the eavesdropper Eve perturbs the polarization of the carrier on its way to Bob. The eavesdropper uses a probe that causes the carrier states to become entangled with the probe states. For detection, Eve makes an information-maximizing von Neumann-type projective measurement and Bob uses a positive operator valued measure ͑POVM͒. Bennett's two-state protocol ͓2͔ is employed, in which a positive response of Bob's POVM receiver, indicating the reception of a photon in a u-polarization or a v-polarization state, is publicly communicated to Eve without revealing which polarization was detected and the corresponding bits then constitute the preliminary key secretly shared by Alice and Bob. Bits corresponding to photons that do not excite the u-or v-polarization state detectors are excluded from the key. Because of the noncommutativity of nonorthogonal photon polarization-measurement operators representing nonorthogonal photon polarization states and also because arbitrary quantum states cannot be cloned ͓3,4͔, any attempt by Eve to eavesdrop can in principle be detected by Bob and Alice.
Entangled translucent eavesdropping is, of course, only one possible eavesdropping scenario. Ekert et al. ͓1͔ also examine so-called opaque eavesdropping and also translucent eavesdropping without entanglement. Lutkenhaus ͓5͔ recently provided a very extensive analysis ͑based on Shannon information and collision probability͒ of security against eavesdropping for a wide class of eavesdropping strategies in the case of the Bennett-Brassard two-basis protocol. For the two-state protocol, Fuchs and Peres ͓6͔ recently performed extensive quantum-information theoretic analyses for a general eavesdropping strategy in which Eve employs a POVM in order to extract as much information as possible. Clearly, a POVM receiver can be used by Eve as well as by Bob. Still other recent analyses of various eavesdropping scenarios are those of Gisin and co-workers ͓7,8͔ and Fuchs et al. ͓9͔ . The present work primarily limits itself to a few aspects of the entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario of Ref.
͓1͔.
We first present in Sec. II a design for the POVM receiver to be used by Bob. The design is totally optical. Because it is also interferometric, it demands precise phase alignment; however, it faithfully represents the perturbed statistics resulting from entangled translucent eavesdropping. Additional analysis pertaining to the device appears in Ref. ͓10͔. Huttner et al. ͓11͔ recently presented a design and experimental proof of principle for an optical setup implementing a socalled loss-induced generalized quantum measurement. The device is also an interferometric implementation of a POVM. However, our design has fewer components and our theoret-ical analysis of the statistics and cryptographic applications of our device is more extensive.
In Sec. III we obtain closed-form algebraic expressions for the error rate and mutual information in each communication channel as a function of the POVM receiver error rate Q and the angle between the carrier polarization states. All explicit dependence on unknown entanglement parameters of the eavesdropper's probe is removed.
In Sec. IV we obtain a significant result. We prove that for the entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario, the unsafe error rate based on standard mutual information comparisons is equivalent to the maximum allowable error rate based on perfect information for the eavesdropper and both are given by the square of the sine of half the complement of the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states of the carrier. The implication of this result is that the unsafe error rate is not in fact overly conservative for entangled translucent eavesdropping, as has been suggested by earlier work ͓1,12͔.
In Sec. V we summarize our results and conclusions. Included in Appendixes A-D are essential mathematical developments that logically support the results in the main text.
II. POVM RECEIVER
The positive operator valued measure ͓13-20͔, also known as the probability operator valued measure ͓14͔, is finding increasing use in quantum cryptography ͓13͔. In the work of Ekert et al. ͓1͔ on entangled translucent eavesdropping, the following set of POVM operators represents the possible measurements performed by Bob's receiver:
Here kets ͉u͘ and ͉v͘ represent the two possible nonorthogonal normalized polarization states of the carrier, with polarizations designated by u and v, respectively. The angle between the corresponding polarization vectors is , from which it follows ͑from the spin-1 behavior of the photon under the rotation group͒ that the overlap between the two states is ͗u͉v͘ϭcos.
͑4͒
The state ͉u͘ encodes bit value 0 and the state ͉v͘ encodes bit value 1. The POVM operators ͑1͒-͑3͒ are positive and their sum is unity. The circuit design for the POVM receiver that we propose here is shown in Fig. 1 ͓21-23͔ . It is an all-optical system. The straight lines with arrows represent possible optical pathways for a photon to move through the device. The path labeled ͉͘ is the incoming path for a photon represented by the arbitrary polarization state given by Eq. ͑7͒. Also in Fig.  1, D 
͑17͒
The device also has two beam splitters designated by BS 1 and BS 2 in Fig. 1 . Beam splitter BS 2 is taken to be a 50-50 beam splitter for a photon entering either of its entrance ports. Both paths from the Wollaston prism to the beam splitter BS 2 have equal optical path lengths. The device is clearly interferometric. Also shown in Fig. 1 is a 90°polarization rotator designated by R, which transforms a photon with polarization vector ê uϪv into one with polarization vector Ϫê uϩv . Also shown in Fig. 1 is a single mirror M .
In Appendix A we obtain expressions for the photon states ͉ i ͘ corresponding to each of the paths designated by ͉ i ͘, iϭ1,2,...,7 in Fig. 1 . The states are
͉ê uϩv ͘.
͑24͒
Here ͉ê uϮv ͘ represent unit kets corresponding to photon polarization vectors ê uϮv . From Eq. ͑23͒ it follows that
and comparing Eq. ͑25͒ with Eq. ͑8͒, one sees that
consistent with Fig. 1 and the requirements for the POVM. Also from Eq. ͑24͒ it follows that
and comparing Eq. ͑27͒ with Eq. ͑9͒, one sees that
͑28͒
again consistent with Fig. 1 . Also, from Eq. ͑20͒ it follows that
and comparing Eq. ͑29͒ with Eq. ͑10͒, it follows that
͑30͒
again consistent with Fig. 1 . Furthermore, using Eqs. ͑29͒, ͑25͒, ͑27͒, ͑4͒, and ͑7͒, one concludes that
or, equivalently,
as required to conserve probability. Equations ͑26͒, ͑28͒, ͑30͒, and ͑32͒ are just the probabilistic properties one would expect of a POVM acting as a probability operator valued measure.
One concludes that the POVM receiver of Fig. 1 satisfies the appropriate statistics. Also, both beam-splitter transmission coefficients ͑A11͒ and ͑A18͒ have the desirable feature that they do not depend on the coefficients ␣ and ␤ associated with an arbitrary incoming polarization state and therefore the device can also faithfully represent the perturbed statistics arising from entangled translucent eavesdropping. The statistics corresponding to the entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario are examined in considerable detail in the following section.
III. ERROR RATES AND MUTUAL INFORMATION
In the entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario of Ref. ͓1͔, the two excited states ͉e u ͘ and ͉e v ͘ of the eavesdropper's probe are entangled with the carrier polarization states ͉u͘ and ͉v͘. Letting ͉ 1 ͘ and ͉ 2 ͘ denote the two possible initial tensor-product states of the carrier with the ground state ͉e͘ of the probe, one has
͑34͒
The effect of the entangled translucent eavesdropping is to convert ͉ 1 ͘ or ͉ 2 ͘ to ͉ 1 Ј͘ or ͉ 2 Ј͘, respectively, where
where a and b are real constants ͓1͔.
Without loss of generality, orthogonal basis states ͉x͘ and ͉y͘, defined by
are chosen to be arranged symmetrically about the two carrier states ͉u͘ and ͉v͘ in the plane of the two-dimensional Hilbert space defined by the carrier states, as shown in Fig. 2 . For convenience here and in the following, our notation does not explicitly distinguish between a ket and its representative ͓24͔. The angle between ͉u͘ and ͉y͘ is equal to the angle between ͉v͘ and ͉x͘; both angles are denoted by ␣, half the complement of the angle between the two polarization states ͉u͘ and ͉v͘. One has therefore ͉u͘ϭͫ cos␣ sin␣ ͬ,
͑38͒
͉v͘ϭͫ sin␣ cos␣ ͬ.
͑39͒
One notes that Eqs. ͑38͒ and ͑39͒ are consistent with Eq. ͑4͒, which can also be written in terms of the angle ␣:
͗u͉v͘ϭsin͑2␣͒.
͑40͒
The probe states ͉e u ͘ and ͉e v ͘ are chosen to be oriented symmetrically relative to the photon polarization states and the orthogonal basis ͓1͔. The angle between the state ͉e u ͘ and the basis state ͉y͘ is equal to the angle between ͉e v ͘ and ͉x͘; these angles are denoted by ␥, as depicted in Fig. 3 . Hence one has
͑42͒
The following normalizations are assumed:
and ͗u͉u͘ϭ͗v͉v͘ϭ͗e u ͉e u ͘ϭ͗e v ͉e v ͘ϭ1.
͑44͒
Since the effect of the eavesdropper's ideal probe can be represented by a unitary transformation ͑if environmental interactions are ignored͒, unitarity requires that
͑45͒
Using Eq. ͑43͒, we transform Eq. ͑45͒ to Re͗ 1 ͉ 2 ͘ϭRe͗ 1 Ј͉ 2 Ј͘.
͑46͒
Therefore, substituting Eqs. ͑33͒-͑36͒ and ͑44͒ into Eq. ͑46͒ and using Eqs. ͑40͒-͑42͒, one concludes that
Also, substituting Eq. ͑35͒ into the third equality of Eq. ͑43͒ and using Eqs. ͑38͒-͑42͒ and ͑44͒, one obtains 1ϭa 2 ϩb 2 ϩ2ab sin͑2␣ ͒sin͑ 2␥ ͒. ͑48͒
Thus unitarity places the constraints given by Eqs. ͑47͒ and ͑48͒ on the values of the entanglement parameters a, b, and ␥ of the eavesdropper's probe, for the carrier states specified by the angle ␣. We refer in the following to Eqs. ͑47͒ and ͑48͒ as the unitarity relations involving the eavesdropping parameters.
To measure the carrier states entangled with her probe states, Eve performs an information-maximizing von Neumann-type measurement represented by projection operators ͉y͗͘y͉ and ͉x͗͘x͉, which test for eigenvectors ͉y͘ and ͉x͘, respectively ͓1,14,25͔. In the following, it is convenient to reuse the symbols ␣ and ␤ as index variables for Alice's transmission and Bob's reception ͑the context distinguishes the usage͒. With an additional index for Eve, we write ͉␣͘ as the perturbed state that Eve relays to Bob after measuring , when Alice transmits ␣. The ranges of these indices are ␣,͕0,1͖; ␤͕0,1,?͖. ͑49͒
In Appendix B we obtain expressions for the probability amplitude ͉␣͘ that Eve measures an when Alice sends an ␣, namely, ͉00͘ϭa cos␥͉u͘ϩb sin␥͉v͘, ͑50͒
͉10͘ϭa sin␥͉u͘ϩb cos␥͉v͘, ͑51͒
͉01͘ϭb cos␥͉u͘ϩa sin␥͉v͘, ͑52͒ ͉11͘ϭb sin␥͉u͘ϩa cos␥͉v͘. ͑53͒
They are all of the general form given by Eq. ͑7͒, with coefficients expressed for each case in terms of the eavesdropping parameters a, b, and ␥. 
͑54͒
By the rules of conditional probability, one has
where ( It is desirable to express all channel error rates explicitly in terms of ͑i͒ the error rate Q in the Alice-Bob channel and ͑ii͒ the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states, or in terms of the angle ␣, which is half the complement of ͑see Fig. 2͒ . Clearly,
͑73͒
In Appendix D we obtain the following explicit expressions for the error rate Q AE (Q,) in the Alice-Eve channel and the error rate Q BE (Q,) in the Bob-Eve channel, respectively ͓21,27,28͔:
where
Equations ͑74͒-͑76͒ parametrize the error rates in the AliceEve and Bob-Eve channels, respectively, in terms of the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states of the carrier and the error rate Q in the Alice-Bob channel.
Because the inconclusive results are removed, the AliceBob channel, although operationally a binary erasure channel, becomes effectively a binary symmetric channel; thus the maximal mutual information ͑channel capacity͒ I AB in the Alice-Bob channel is given by the well-known expression for a binary symmetric channel, namely ͓1,29,30͔,
expressed in terms of the error rate Q in the Alice-Bob channel. Since the Bob-Eve and Alice-Eve channels are also effectively binary symmetric, one also has for the mutual information in the Bob-Eve channel
and for the mutual information in the Alice-Eve channel
where Q BE and Q AE are given by Eqs. ͑75͒ and ͑74͒, respectively ͓21,27,28͔. Thus the mutual information in each channel is also expressed explicitly in terms of the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states and the error rate in the Alice-Bob channel, with no explicit dependence on the generally unknown eavesdropping parameters.
IV. UNSAFE ERROR RATE
The error rate in the Alice-Bob channel, resulting from eavesdropping, is considered to be unsafe if the mutual information in the Alice-Bob channel does not exceed the minimum of the mutual information in the Alice-Eve channel and of that in the Bob-Eve channel ͓1͔. Equivalently, this unsafe transmission criterion may be expressed as
It is suggested in Ref.
͓1͔ that this condition may be overly cautious; however, we proceed to show that this is not the case for the entangled translucent eavesdropping scenario. We define the unsafe error rate Q u to be the smallest error rate Q in the Alice-Bob channel such that the equality in Eq. ͑80͒ is satisfied, namely, Therefore, comparing Eq. ͑89͒ with Eq. ͑81͒, one can conclude that ͓21,27,28͔
The maximum allowable error rate Q max is the value of the error rate in the Alice-Bob channel, for which the mutual information in the Bob-Eve channel is unity, namely ͓1͔,
This corresponds to perfect mutual information for the eavesdropper. Comparing Eq. ͑91͒ with Eq. ͑87͒, one observes that
in accord with Ref.
͓1͔.
Finally, comparing Eq. ͑90͒ with Eq. ͑92͒, we obtain the result
Thus, for entangled translucent eavesdropping, the unsafe error rate is in fact equal to the maximum allowable error rate. Using Eq. ͑73͒, one can also express Eqs. ͑90͒, ͑92͒, and ͑93͒ in terms of the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states, namely ͓21,27,28͔,
In this case, the unsafe error rate is not in fact overly conservative.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a design for a receiver that is an all-optical realization of a POVM for use in quantum cryptography. The device, depicted in Fig. 1 , interferometrically implements the statistics of all three POVM operators. Also, we have obtained closed-form algebraic expressions for the error rate and mutual information in each channel, expressed in terms of the error rate in the Alice-Bob channel and the angle between the two nonorthogonal photon polarization states of the carrier. The expressions are given by Eqs. ͑74͒-͑76͒, ͑78͒, and ͑79͒. We also demonstrated that, in the presence of entangled translucent eavesdropping, the unsafe error rate based on standard mutual information comparisons is equivalent to the maximum allowable error rate based on perfect information for the eavesdropper. 
APPENDIX A: POVM RECEIVER STATES
It follows from the geometry of Fig. 1 and the projective property of polarized photon states ͓Eq. ͑4͔͒ that the state of a photon taking the path designated by the state ͉ 1 ͘ is given by
where ͉ê uϩv ͘ represents a unit ket corresponding to polarization vector ê uϩv . Also in Eq. ͑A1͒, the Dirac bracket, appearing as an overall factor of the unit ket, is the probability amplitude that a photon takes the path under consideration. Analogously, one has
where ͉ê uϪv ͘ represents a unit ket corresponding to polarization vector ê uϪv . Expanding Eqs. ͑A1͒ and ͑A2͒, using Eq. ͑4͒, we obtain
͑A4͒
The detectors D u , D v , and D ? are treated here as ideal. We require ͗ 6 ͉ 6 ͘ϭ͉͗A u ͉͘,
͑A5͒
in order that the expectation value of A u , measured by the detector D u in Fig. 1 , equal the probability ͗ 6 ͉ 6 ͘ that a photon is incident on it. This makes the POVM effectively a probability operator valued measure. Analogously, we require Fig. 1 one sees that in order for the state ͉ 3 ͘ of a photon to result from a photon in state ͉ 1 ͘ hitting the beam splitter BS 1 , the transmission coefficient T 1 of beam splitter BS 1 must be given by
and therefore substituting Eqs. ͑A8͒ and ͑A3͒ in Eq. ͑A10͒, one obtains
independent of ␣ and ␤. The corresponding reflection coefficient becomes
and from Fig. 1 one sees that
͑A13͒
Substituting Eqs. ͑A12͒ and ͑A3͒ in Eq. ͑A13͒, one obtains
Next, taking account of the reflection at BS 1 that introduces a factor of i, it therefore follows that
͑A15͒
Also one sees from the geometry of Fig. 1 , together with Eq. ͑A4͒, that, because of the polarization rotator R, which effectively converts polarization in the direction ê uϪv into that in the direction Ϫê uϩv , one has
Next, from Fig. 1 , one sees that because of beam splitter BS 2 , states ͉ 4 ͘ and ͉ 5 ͘ combine and interfere to produce states ͉ 6 ͘ and ͉ 7 ͘. In particular, because a 50-50 beam splitter is assumed here for BS 2 with reflection coefficient
and transmission coefficient
for both entrance paths, one has
͑A20͒
The implementation of the interferometric equations ͑A19͒ and ͑A20͒ demands precise phase alignment in the interferometric circuit of Fig. 1 Here we have used Eq. ͑37͒ and I is the unit operator in the carrier space.
The probability amplitude ͉00͘ that Eve measures a 0 with her information-maximizing measurement when Alice sends a 0 may be determined from the projection
͑B3͒
Proceeding to evaluate the left-hand side of Eq. ͑B3͒, using Eqs. ͑B1͒, ͑35͒, ͑41͒, and ͑42͒, one obtains
and therefore, comparing Eq. ͑B5͒ with Eq. ͑B3͒, one obtains ͉00͘ϭa cos␥͉u͘ϩb sin␥͉v͘. ͑B6͒
Similarly, the probability amplitude ͉10͘ that Eve measures a 1 when Alice sends a 0 is determined by
from which it follows that ͉10͘ϭa sin␥͉u͘ϩb cos␥͉v͘. ͑B8͒ Also, the probability amplitude ͉01͘ that Eve measures a 0 when Alice sends a 1 is determined by
͑B9͒
which yields ͉01͘ϭb cos␥͉u͘ϩa sin␥͉v͘. ͑B10͒
Finally, the probability amplitude ͉11͘ that Eve measures a 1 when Alice sends a 1 is determined by
and therefore ͉11͘ϭb sin␥͉u͘ϩa cos␥͉v͘. ͑B12͒
Equations ͑B6͒, ͑B8͒, ͑B10͒, and ͑B12͒ are the four possible perturbed states resulting from the perturbation by Eve of states on their way from Alice to Bob.
APPENDIX C: ERROR RATES
If we denote by r, w, and i, respectively, the number of generic measurement results that are right, wrong, and inconclusive, then the error rate q before inconclusive results are discarded is clearly given by qϭ w wϩrϩi . ͑C1͒
Also, the error rate Q after inconclusive results are discarded is 
͑D13͒
The angle ␥ may be taken to be in the range 0р␥р/4. ͑D14͒
One also has the following trigonometric identities expressed in terms of Eq. ͑D13͒:
